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Abstract 
The opportunities provided by digital technologies to governments in distributing digital 
welfare payments, or government-to-person (G2P) payments to poor citizens has had a 
profound effect on the inclusion agenda in many developing countries. However, paucity 
remains on research that investigates the motivations behind the transition from cash to digital 
G2P payments and its effects on institutional practices. Hence, this paper examined the case of 
a government social cash programme in Pakistan that implemented digital payments for 
disbursing G2P payments to poor women beneficiaries. It explored how the interplay of 
political forces with external and institutional forces influenced the construction of digital 
payments and its implications on programme managers. Also, how digital payments affected 
the power equilibrium for certain political actors involved in the programme. Through case 
study research, qualitative data was collected through interviews conducted with programme 
designers and stakeholders in the G2P programme. The findings concluded that digital 
technologies were socially-embedded in the organisational context, so were progressively 
transformative for programme designers. Hence, digital payments led to the institutional 
strengthening of the G2P programme, albeit, diminished the power of other political actors. As 
contribution, the paper sheds light on how the construction of digital payments was a socio-
political process that shifted the power equilibrium by creating new structures of power and 
authority. This paper has implications for governments, banks and international funding 
agencies who are utilising digital payments to promote the inclusion agenda for its citizens.  
Keywords: Digital payments, G2P payments, design, qualitative methods, political power, 
developing countries, Pakistan 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
During the past two decades, many social cash programmes in developing countries are 
actively engaged in delivering social protection to economically deprived populations. Since 
the introduction of these programmes in Latin America in the early 1990s, the popularity and 
support of social cash transfers amongst national governments as well as the international 
development community has considerably increased. Social cash programmes have therefore 
moved ‘from the margins of development policy towards the mainstream in a number of global 
regions’ (Arnold, Conway and Greenslade, 2011, p. 7).  In this context, the term social cash is 
described as, ‘regular non-contributory payments of money provided by the government or 
non-governmental organisations to individuals and households’ (Samson, 2009, p. 43).  
 
The opportunities that digital technologies provide to social cash programmes in  disbursing 
social cash to poor citizens has received attention from governments, policy makers and 
practitioners around the globe (DFID, 2009). With the spur of branchless banking channels, 
the utilization of digital tools by many governments to disburse government-to-person (G2P) 
payments, or social cash to millions of its poor people is becoming significant to promote the 
financial inclusion agenda. Since branchless banking provides a low cost delivery channel for 
the disbursement of G2P payments, this reinforces government’s incentives to exploit the 
infrastructure and transit to digital payments (Bold, Porteous and Rotman, 2012). Further, the 
dramatic growth in the number of government social transfer schemes has provided an 
unprecedented opportunity to use innovative digital payment channels to increase financial 
access for unbanked recipients whilst decreasing transaction costs, improving security and 
expanding the recipient base. As electronic payment methods differ with respect to the network 
of pay points , for instance, automated teller machines (ATM), point-of-sale (PoS) devices, or 
mobile money agents, recipients access their payments through a variety of technologies- 
smartcards, magnetic stripe cards, or mobile phones with enhanced security identifiers, 
including biometric identifiers or Personal Identification Numbers (PIN). Hence, digital 
payments have ‘banked’ recipients which can be withdrawn safely and conveniently at a range 
of pay points (Emmett, 2012).  
 
Research indicates that harnessing the power of technology in making financial services 
accessible to the poor helps foster financial innovation for sustainable economic growth and 
development (Oluwatayo, 2014). In relation to this, a growing body of research shows that 
digital cash transfers may increase the impact of social transfer schemes by providing access 
to financial services. Whilst G2P payments are known to socially include low income 
households, the transition to digital payments may combine social and financial inclusion 
objectives for governments. Hence, governments are making increasing efforts to converge 
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social inclusion and financial inclusion objectives, within a single policy, for poverty 
elimination (Zimmerman and Holmes, 2012). According to a World Bank Report (2001),  
 
Access to financial markets is important for poor people. Like all economic agents, low income 
households and micro-enterprises can benefit from credit, savings, and insurance services. Such 
services help to manage risk and to smooth consumption and allow people to take advantage of 
profitable business opportunities and increase their earnings potential. But financial markets, 
because of their special features, often serve poor people badly. Since poor people often have 
insufficient traditional forms of collateral (such as physical assets) to offer, they are often 
excluded from traditional financial markets. Transactions costs are often high relative to the 
small loans typically demanded by poor people, and in areas where population density is low, 
physical access to banking services can be very difficult (World Bank, 2001). 
 
 
Hence, digital technologies offer the route for governments to increase poor peoples’ access to 
financial markets through the disbursement of electronic G2P payments. Governments, 
typically, contract with banks or mobile network operators (MNOs) under various business 
arrangements for transferring social cash directly into beneficiaries’ digital bank accounts 
(Vincent and Cull, 2011). One major reason for the private sector involvement is that without 
their expertise and technological infrastructure, it is difficult for governments to transfer digital 
G2P payments independently (Oberlander and Brossmann, 2014). As governments do not 
provide contracted agents with POS devices or ATMs, their partnerships with the financial or 
mobile industry establishes a network of banking agents, or pay points for recipients to cash-
out their digital payments. Moreover, the reduction in transaction and administrative costs with 
reduced security risks provides incentives for governments to embrace digital channels for 
enhancing outreach of payments in remote populations. Further, digital payments are known 
to considerably reduce corruption and fraud- which otherwise presents a heavy strain on 
programme budgets, in addition to increasing operational efficiencies for the disbursement of 
social cash via digital platforms (Almazan, 2013; Oberlander and Brossmann, 2014).  
Studies from middle income countries displayed that digital payments offered savings for 
governments that also extended the outreach of G2P payments to a larger population of 
beneficiaries (Bold, Porteous and Rotman, 2012). For instance, Brazil reduced the transaction 
costs of its Bolsa Família programme from 14.7 percent to 2.6 percent of the grant value 
(Lindert, et al., 2007). In South Africa, there was evidence suggesting that the variable costs 
for G2P programmes more than halved after implementation of electronic delivery payment 
channels (Pickens, Porteous and Rotman, 2009). Furthermore, it was estimated that by 
diminishing corruption, the Government of India could save up to USD $18.3 billion (28 
percent of the total costs) per year, provided if all welfare schemes, including the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) disbursed digital workfare payments to 
recipients (Ehrbeck, et al., 2010).  
Other studies briefly outlined how Banco Davivienda in Columbia delivered G2P using 
Daviplata mobile money, but there was little evidence on how these payments linked 
beneficiaries to financially inclusive services. Similarly, in Malawi, Airtel distributed digital 
payments to 23,000 families through Airtel Money for Save the Children and the World Food 
P01- Power, Politics and Digital Development 
 
 
4 
 
Programme, but owing to the small scale of the project, the impact it had on financial inclusion 
was rather unpronounced (Almazan, 2013). Another programme that used m-banking for 
disbursing G2P payments was the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo- paying monthly demobilization allowances 
of USD $25 to retired soldiers, residing in villages that were well beyond the reach of the 
country’s restrictive financial system (Bankable Frontier Associates, 2009). 
Whilst policy agendas have emphasised the deployment of digital technologies to connect poor 
households to the financial sector, so far, there is little research that explores the innovation of 
digital payments, particularly, in the context of public social cash programmes. Whilst extant 
research on ICT innovation affords a techno-economic lens that focusses on business models 
from programme managers or mobile operator’s perspectives, paucity remains on exploring 
the construction of digital payments through a socio-political lens in government cash 
programmes.  
Hence, the objectives of this paper is to critically examine how the interplay of external and 
institutional forces influenced the social construction from cash to digital payments in the 
specific case of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in Pakistan. My main research 
question is,’ how were digital payments socially constructed under the influence of external 
and internal institutional forces that affected the power dynamics in the BISP programme?’ In 
order to answer this question, my research design utilised qualitative methods, such as 
interviews for collecting primary data and the data was thematically analysed based on the 
interpretations of various stakeholders involved in the construction of digital G2P payments.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I will first critically review the theoretical 
literature based on Avgerou’s (2008) study that analyses digital innovation projects in 
developing countries, and hence, frames the theoretical framework in this study. Section 3 
introduces the specific context of digital payments based on the branchless banking sector in 
Pakistan. Section 4 introduces the case study for this research and informs how qualitative data 
was collected from key stakeholders in the BISP programme, and how it was analysed. In 
section 5, the findings are presented, following which in the final section 6, I will discuss the 
findings and conclude the study by shedding light on the contributions the paper makes in the 
ICT for development domain.  
2. ICT Innovation in Developing Countries  
 
The study draws on the Information Communications for Development (ICT4D) literature that 
is situated in the domain of Information Systems for Developing Countries (ISDC). 
Invariably, economic and social theory converge on the relationship between ICT and socio-
economic change to suggest that efforts to spread information and communication technologies 
are necessary to participate in the emerging global economy, but not adequate to create 
economic growth (Avgerou, 1998; 2003). However, attributing change to technologies, new 
technologies, or mediating devices, are generative in creating new and direct forms of 
communication, economic activity, information retrieval, and perhaps, even new forms of 
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international development (Tapscott and Williams, 2006; Heeks, 2008; 2009; 2010; 
Thompson, 2008). Therefore, the diffusion of ICT related activities is perceived to be linked to 
structural changes in the world economy and interventions in organisations that puts pressure 
on policy makers and governments to re-design their emerging socio-economic structures and 
organisational innovations related to ICT innovation (Avgerou, 1998; 2000; Madon, Krishna 
and Michael, 2010). 
 
2.1 ICT Transfer and Diffusion   
 
In the literature, ICT innovation may be categorised as technological-deterministic- that is 
mainly universalistic with narrowly situated perspectives on innovation (Avgerou and Madon, 
2004). This implies that technological innovation is guided by planned methodical actions that 
steers organisational performance with emphasis on the design and role of technology solutions 
within business models. Hence, techno-economic reasoning and logic over-rides the rationality 
that technological innovations need to fit within social constructs (Avgerou, 2001; 2008; 2010). 
This discourse being universalistic separates technological innovation from its immediate 
context, and often acknowledges contextual contingencies (Avgerou and Madon, 2004). As 
there is a clash between the techno-economic rationality for development and the local system 
of reasoning, failure to cultivate behaviours in support of  technological innovation provides 
little hope for sustained development in local communities (Ciborra, 2005; Avgerou and 
McGrath, 2007; Kyem, 2012).  
Avgerou (2008) identified three discourses that combined the nature of ICT innovation 
processes with the relevant conceptual constructs of these processes. First, at the institutional 
level, ICT innovation in developing countries is perceived as a process of ICT transfer and 
diffusion of organisational practices from advanced economies to developing nations (Sahay 
and Avgerou, 2002; Avgerou, 2008). Combining and adapting technology within local 
structures leads to progressive transformation (Avgerou, 2010) that is rooted in the assumption 
that ICT innovation in developing countries is mainly concerned with ‘catching up’ with the 
technological advanced rich economies to achieve prosperity, improvements in health, 
education, and political participation in the same way as developed countries (Okpaku, 2006; 
Avgerou, 2008; 2010). In this context, some international development agencies, including the 
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Economic Forum 
(WEF) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have aggressively pushed the notion of ICTs 
to the forefront of their developmental agendas. In doing so, they have linked ICT with 
economic prosperity and poverty reduction in developing countries (United Nations Human 
Development Report, 2001; Hamel, 2010). 
However, other scholars have subscribed to a more critical stance against the ‘fad of ICTs for 
development’ and are rather sceptical of the motivations behind the thrust towards 
digitalization in developing countries (Wade, 2002). ICT transfer and diffusion from developed 
to developing countries is perceived with suspicion that the available ICT artefacts and business 
models may not necessarily meet the developing country’s needs (Sahay and Avgerou, 2002; 
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Thompson, 2008; Avgerou, 2010). This is because agendas dictated by international policy 
makers and donor organisations may interfere with local developmental agendas (Thompson, 
2008) and may cause disruptive transformation. Since, technologies are designed and 
developed elsewhere, developing countries may become vulnerable to the increasing 
complexities arising from the inclusion of digital projects (Avgerou, 2010). Wade (2002), for 
instance, argues that foreign countries exploit their monopolistic powers to reinforce their 
intellectual dominance and authority in the developmental field. Similarly, other scholars also 
conform to the techno-functionalist thinking of developed nations that conceals a powerful 
intellectual imperialism (Avgerou, Ciborra and Land, 2004; Wade 2004; Ciborra, 2005). 
Hence, scholars have expressed their concerns related to the challenges faced in following the 
trends and standards of ICT-enabled globalisation resulting from ICT innovation in developing 
countries (Wade, 2002; Avgerou, 1998; 2010).  
Whilst the technological deterministic perspective advocates techno-centric universal solutions 
through the use of appropriate standards and protocols that rationalises the interplay between 
local and global domains (Sahay and Avgerou, 2002; Avgerou and Madon, 2004), it confers a 
policy driven rationale for institutionalising digital technologies for practitioners, governments, 
donor organisations and regulatory institutions. Critics, therefore, argue that the current 
emphasis on digital innovation in the financial sector inherently dismisses the specific socio-
cultural context of technology in which it was created and used (Qureshi, 2014; Duncombe and 
Boateng, 2009).  
 
2.2 Socially-Embedded ICTs  
 
The socio-technical approach draws on contextual studies (Pettigrew, 1985) in favour of user-
driven approaches for technological innovation (Mumford and Weir, 1979; Mumford, 2000; 
Avgerou and Madon, 2004). While Pettigrew’s contextual approach continues to be followed 
in ISDC studies, other theoretical approaches, including social constructionist and situated 
approaches have been introduced to study ICT innovation in developing countries’ contexts 
(Avgerou, 2001). This pertains to the second discourse presented by Avgerou (2008) that 
underscores the significance of the indigenous context and social shaping of new ICT’s in 
innovation projects in developing countries (Avgerou and Walsham, 2000; Avgerou, 2001; 
2008). Within this perspective, ICT innovation is perceived as a situated, or socially-embedded 
process- enacted by social actors who make meaning of their immediate context (Avgerou, 
2002). Hence, digital innovation arises from the social, organisational, cultural and political 
contexts that shape its form and design (Avgerou, 2008; 2010). Technology innovation is a 
socially constructed course of action undertaken by local actors that steers organisational 
change. While its purpose arises from local problems, its course is determined by the way local 
actors make sense of it, and incorporate the context of its use in the design that leads to 
progressive transformation (Avgerou, 2002; 2010; Sahay and Avgerou, 2002). Hence, local 
innovation steers new socio-technical arrangements in developing countries for the progressive 
transformation of communities (Avgerou, 2002; 2008; 2010; Braa, et al., 2007). This 
assumption explains how the innovation of indigenous ICT projects in organisations or rural 
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communities may enact new structures for organisational change, as ICT innovation focusses 
on users’ needs whilst designing digital inclusion projects in communities (Cecchini and Scott, 
2003; Walsham and Sahay, 2006; Casal, 2007). Although technological innovations evolve to 
gradually fit with organisational needs, they are most successful when they are integrated 
within local structures and indigenous channels (Avgerou, 2000; 2010; Casal, 2007; Madon, et 
al., 2009).   
 
Despite the promising outcomes, the socio-technical perspective may sometimes also result in 
disruptive transformation arising from political discourses within social actors (Avgerou, 
2010). This is because the inclusion of digital projects, owing to their political nature, may 
sometimes create inequalities that may emerge within cultures and societies, so perhaps may 
require greater government support in focussing on the local context in developing countries 
(Madon, et al., 2009; Madon, Krishna and Michael, 2010). However, whilst the ICT transfer 
and diffusion process may represent the macro-level, socially-embedded ICTs may narrowly 
focus on the local level, so hence, it is important to strike a middle ground between the 
universalistic and situated theories that dominate ICT4D studies (Avgerou, Ciborra and Land, 
2004).  
3. Digital Payment Innovation in Pakistan  
 
Pakistan is a developing country with a population exceeding 190 million (Pakistan Economic 
Survey, 2015). However, the penetration of formal financial services remains low, by any 
measure, as approximately 88 percent of the population is unbanked with roughly 23 million 
bank accounts, 11,600 bank branches and 6,232 ATMs across the country for the entire 
population (Anwar, 2013). This problem is particularly severe in rural areas, where there are 
fewer than 2,500 bank branches (CGAP, 2011) for 61 percent of the rural population in 
Pakistan (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2015). As the problem of financial access remains low 
for the majority of the population, this exacerbates the financial divide between the poor and 
rich in the country. 
 
Against this backdrop, a dynamic telecommunications sector and permissive regulator has laid 
the foundations for an emerging branchless banking sector (CGAP, 2011). In June 2007, the 
Banking Policy and Regulations Department of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) released its 
Policy Paper on the Regulatory Framework for ‘Mobile Banking in Pakistan’. The Policy Paper 
stated that branchless banking offers a distinct alternative to conventional branch-based 
banking, in the sense that the customer conducts financial transactions at a whole range of retail 
agents instead of at bank branches. The Branchless Banking Regulations1 were implemented 
                                                          
1 According to the Banking Policy Regulations (2011), ‘branchless banking’ is defined to exclude information 
services, provided by banks to their existing customers via channels, including mobile phones, internet and SMS 
channels. This is because branchless banking targets the unbanked to promote financial inclusion, rather than 
encouraging models that are additive- providing services to existing customers.   
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in 2008 as articulated in the Policy Paper (CGAP, 2011). The State Bank of Pakistan has 
therefore achieved international recognition for its enabling approach that has created a climate 
of certainty through the promulgation of branchless banking guidelines in the country (CGAP, 
2012). 
 
The fundamental requirements that support the growth of branchless banking are management 
capabilities for handling large operations, managing agent’s network and distribution channels, 
and the utilisation of technology. While the State Bank of Pakistan promotes the branchless 
infrastructure, it encourages the use of successful global practices within a regulatory and 
supervisory mechanism that enables governments, financial institutions, including 
microfinance banks (MFBs) to develop viable business models. Branchless banking regulation2 
has thus taken a permissive and constructive regulatory approach by providing clear guidance 
for businesses to adjust regulations where necessary. As articulated in a CGAP (2012) report, 
Presently, the country is witnessing the beginning of a new retail banking revolution, whereby, 
a large segment of the population, previously unbanked, has started entering into a new realm 
of financial services (Branchless Banking Newsletter, 2011, cited in CGAP, 2012). 
 
The Strategic Framework under the Financial Inclusion Programme launched in 2011, and 
supported by UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) advocates inclusive 
financial services for underserved populations in Pakistan. Hence, there is cumulative demand 
and pressure on the economic sector to develop the necessary infrastructure to foster inclusive 
financial growth in the country. The strategy focusses on a variety of measures to accelerate 
the outreach of financial services- promoting alternative delivery channels, mobilising deposit, 
up-scaling for micro-enterprise development, improving governance, building institutional 
capacity and regulating mechanisms for microfinance providers (Kazmi, 2012). The Governor 
of the State Bank of Pakistan has remarked,  
 
Branchless banking and microfinance initiatives in Pakistan are among the hidden forces of 
resilience offering the best hope for the country’s future- being in perpetual motion at the 
grassroots with ceaseless creativity, so people find affordable solutions to their basic needs 
(Anwar, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, substantial growth in the branchless banking industry has motivated G2P 
programmes in Pakistan to exploit digital channels for delivering G2P payments. Here, the role 
of technology is pivotal in promoting alternative digital channels in enabling the government 
sector to disburse G2P payments via mobile technologies, point-of-sale (POS) devices, 
automatic teller machines (ATMs) or smart/debit cards (CGAP, 2011). There is consensus 
between the government, policy makers and financial regulators to improve financial access 
for the unbanked poor through the use of innovative and inclusive delivery channels (Anwar, 
2013). According to Rotman, Kumar and Parada (2013),  
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Pakistan serves as an example of how public and private institutions together can move a 
country towards a digital financially inclusive system. Government and public actors have 
created the enabling environment and have provided seed funding, while private actors are 
developing the infrastructure, services and a long-term business case (Rotman, Kumar and 
Parada, 2013). 
 
Hence, branchless banking initiatives have enabled government cash programmes in Pakistan 
to digitise a large share of G2P payments to its poor citizens. Whilst social cash transfers 
constitute around 11 percent of government payments, salaries make up 68 percent and 
pensions comprise of 21 percent of the total G2P flows (Rotman, Kumar and Parada, 2013). 
As digital payments have the potential to extend the outreach of G2P payments in remote 
populations, the government actively encourages the branchless banking industry to move the 
country towards a digital financially inclusive system.  
4. Case Study and Data Collection  
 
The interpretive case study (Walsham, 2006; Yin, 2009) of the Benazir Income Support 
Programme (BISP) investigates how power and politics were affected by the implementation 
of digital payments in the programme. Initially, various digital tools, including smart cards and 
mobile phone banking were deployed in selected pilot districts for receiving digital payments, 
eventually, the Benazir Debit Card was phased in nationally. The case study is instrumental 
and provides rich insights on the interpretations gathered from a variety of stakeholders who 
participated in the digital innovation phase of the BISP programme.  
 
4.1 Benazir Income Support Programme  
 
The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) was launched in 2008 by the former Pakistan 
People’s Party Government, and remains the first ever comprehensive, universal and 
transparent social safety programme in the country. It is the flagship programme of the 
Pakistani Government to achieve the targets set by the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) for reducing chronic malnutrition in impoverished communities. 
The concept of BISP is derived from the widely acclaimed developmental theories of social 
protection that are ubiquitously implemented in both the developing and developed world 
(BISP, 2014). 
The Programme was established through an Act of Parliament, and is implemented through an 
organisation working under the executive patronage of the Prime Minister, while the President 
of Pakistan is the Chief Patron of the programme. BISP has nationwide presence with the Head 
Office located in the Federal Capital- Islamabad, and 6 regional offices at the Provincial 
Capitals, including Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit Baltistan (GB). There are 31 
divisional offices comprising of 2000 staff working in the regional branches across the country. 
The organisation is headed by a Board, with a nominated Chairperson, and an Executive 
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Committee- comprising of a Secretary and Cabinet Members hailing from the finance, 
economic and foreign affair ministries, in addition to other Non-Government Members (BISP, 
2014).  
The primary objective of the programme is to cushion the effects of chronic poverty and 
mitigate the impacts of rampant inflation of food and fuel prices on poor households in 
Pakistan. Over the years, it has successively become the country’s primary safety net 
programme and provides monthly social cash transfers of USD3 $14.3 per month (Pakistani 
Rupees- PKR 1500) to around 5.3 million4 low-income households (BISP, 2014). However, 
the payments are disbursed to women only on a quarterly basis and amount to USD $43 (PKR 
4500) per quarter. BISP supplements households incomes that fall below USD $57 (PKR 6000) 
monthly. As the programme targets women only as household heads, BISP aims to empower 
women. This is because women beneficiaries, living in abject poverty, belong to the most 
under-privileged and vulnerable sections of society. Furthermore, economic deprivation, 
regardless of political affinity, racial identity, geographical location and religious beliefs are 
other criteria that qualify beneficiaries to register with BISP. The programme covers 
households from all provinces of the country- Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhwa and other regions- Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir (AJK), Gilgit Baltistan (GB) and Islamabad Capital Territory (BISP, 2014).  
BISP holds the largest database of the poorest families in Pakistan after execution of the largest 
and first ever door-to-door poverty survey undertaken in collaboration with the National 
Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). The poverty score-card survey, introduced in 
October 2010, was the first of its kind in South Asia and assisted BISP to objectively identify 
7.7 million households which were the ‘poorest of the poor’. The poverty score-card was 
designed with financial and technical assistance from the World Bank and Department for 
International Development (DFID), UK. Based on a proxy means test (PMT) it determined the 
welfare status of households- related to household size, asset ownership and education of 
household members. Hence, the data was assessed for the planning of pro-poor development 
policies and practices and has been registered by NADRA, and shared through protocols with 
other international and national organizations for research purposes.  
The programme is primarily funded by the Government of Pakistan and disbursed an amount 
that was expected to cross PKR. 70 billion (USD $667,908,500) by the end of FY 2013-15. It 
also receives unprecedented support from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, such as, 
World Bank and DFID UK (BISP, 2014).  
 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Primary data was collected in March and April 2014 in Pakistan. I used qualitative methods for 
data collection (Walsham, 1995; 2006), based on which total 17 semi-structured interviews 
                                                          
3 Based on the exchange rate in February 2016: 1USD = 104.91 PKR 
4 Number of BISP beneficiaries as on March 2014 recorded in the Brief on BISP- A Social Safety Net: 
Government of Pakistan  
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were conducted with BISP officials, bankers, mobile operator staff and international agency 
donors. I also drew on secondary data contained in organisational reports, official documents 
and formal and informal media sources. The interviews were held in Islamabad with the BISP 
head office staff, mobile operator staff (Easypaisa and U-fone), bankers (United Bank Limited, 
Alfalah Bank and Summit Bank) and donor officials (DFID). The participants were purposively 
sampled based on their job descriptions, and as experts in their job roles, they were able to 
provide the specific information that was relevant to answer the interview questions in the 
study. Prior, to conducting the interviews, the participants were provided with a participant 
information sheet that outlined the purpose of the study, the nature of information sought, data 
privacy and ethical guidelines to be followed. The interview schedule was modified for every 
stakeholder according to the nature of information that was required which fed in to the primary 
research question. All interviews were conducted in English and lasted between 45-60 minutes 
on average. The majority were audio-recorded, transcribed and were uploaded into the software 
NVivo for thematic analysis (Boyatiz, 1998; 2007; Taylor and Ussher, 2001; Braun and Clark, 
2006). The interview data was coded at the nodes under various themes, and repeated themes 
that emerged from various data sources were compared and grouped under the same theme. 
Similar themes were then clustered into categories that represented a higher level of 
abstraction. The themes were then analysed and interpreted as findings through the perspectives 
captured by the participants, as presented in the next section.  
5. Findings and Discussion 
 
The following themes emerged from the data collected from interviews which were mapped in 
relation to answer the research question in the study.  
5.1 The Transition from Cash to Digital Payments 
Initially, when the programme was launched in 2008 in the absence of a banking infrastructure, 
social cash was distributed to women beneficiaries by local parliamentarians in cash, or through 
money orders by postmen. The Director of Payments at BISP elaborated,  
 
One of the reason for the initial Pakistan Post payments were that out of approximately six 
thousand, seven hundred union councils, more than seven hundred union councils did not have 
any bank branch or bank. Later, we turned towards branchless banking because that was the 
only available option that would have large outreach in the country to conveniently serve the 
beneficiaries (Director of Payments, BISP). 
 
The Director Payments further clarified why cash payments were introduced at the beginning- 
for knitting into the socio-cultural tradition of women observing ‘purdah’ (veil) who were 
confined to their homes.  
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Another reason for having cash payments initially was that because the beneficiary was a 
woman, there was sensitivity in certain areas of the country where women were not allowed to 
step outside their homes to get their money.  So in the beginning, we thought that it would be 
better to start with Pakistan Post. And then, at a later stage, when we know that beneficiaries’ 
families have now understood the importance of BISP, they would allow women to have their 
own bank accounts and go out to withdraw their money- one of the main objectives of the 
programme was to empower women (Director of Payments, BISP). 
 
However, in 2010, after the new initiative of the poverty score-card that objectively targeted 
beneficiaries, digital G2P payments were collected by women through digital tools, such as 
smart cards, mobile phones or debit cards. As figures indicated, approximately 94% of 
beneficiaries received payments through digital tools (BISP, 2014). Moreover, digital 
innovation platforms extended the outreach of payments to a wider audience of poor 
beneficiaries. 
 
5.2 External Forces  
 
The table below highlights the external forces that influenced the social construction of digital 
payments in the BISP programme. The forces represent diverse viewpoints that affected the 
power dynamics between various social actors involved in the social construction of 
technology.  
 
Political Forces Regulatory Forces Economic 
Forces 
International Forces 
Government 
pressure  
 
Diminishing 
political power  
 
Political and 
security risks 
 
Branchless banking 
regulation 
Bank-led model  
 
  
Profitable 
business case 
Commission and 
float  
Limited purpose 
accounts 
 
International donor 
support and funding 
Institutional 
strengthening  
 
 
Themes Illustrating the Effects of External Forces on the Social Construction of Mobile Banking 
Source: Interviews 
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5.2.1 Political Forces  
 
Although certain politicians in the Pakistani Government resisted the switch to digital G2P 
payments, there was immense political pressure from the President which coerced BISP 
management to make the political decision. Since the programme was politically significant 
and centrepiece of the Government’s strategy to achieve the MDGs targets for poverty 
alleviation, BISP was associated with a political tag, so was criticised by the civil society for 
achieving political gains. Nonetheless, other political actors welcomed the decision as digital 
payment channels were secure, especially in politically turbulent areas where security staff 
were deployed to provide security during the delivery of payments to beneficiaries. Hence, 
digital payments reduced transaction and payment processing costs for BISP. The Executive 
Vice President of a bank remarked,  
 
I think we were lucky enough- the Finance Minister was against the idea but Chairman NADRA 
was very supportive of us, so he went to the President and Prime Minister and came back with 
the approval of shifting to digital payments. So I think that all those factors combined together, 
and security, put the pressure on the Government and BISP (Executive Vice President, UBL). 
 
Moreover, the banking sector recognised a potential business case in disbursing electronic G2P 
payments, so successfully convinced the Government to digitise G2P payments, as noted by a 
banker,  
 
So I was invited to a meeting with the President and he also started telling BISP folks that you 
need to move quickly on the digital payment side. The Government of Pakistan was not willing 
to fund mobile phones, neither any donor agency was willing to fund handsets because it was 
a political issue at that point in time. So we went ahead and we gave about sixty thousand 
mobile phones in one district free of cost to people at our expense, and ran that project of mobile 
phone based payments (Executive Vice President, UBL). 
 
As presented earlier, the targeting of poor households for distributing G2P payments was 
initially entrusted to local parliamentarians. However, with the introduction of digital 
payments, households were objectively targeted through the poverty score-card survey that 
automatically eliminated many undeserved families from the beneficiary records held by 
NADRA. Survey enumerators visited each household, although it was learnt that they 
sometimes selected a central location in the village or community where community members 
could come and have their eligibility forms filled out. While this process may have excluded 
certain households who may have had differences with local politicians, or power brokers, the 
majority of beneficiaries flocked in the communal spaces to get their poverty score-card forms 
filled by enumerators who had no particular affiliation with a specific political party. So since 
the prescribed method for the survey was a door-to-door census, the poverty score-card by-
passed the conventional intervention of local patrons, or politicians for identifying eligible 
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beneficiaries. Although local intermediaries were not completely absent from the process, they 
usually remained peripheral due to the strong message for attaining universal enumeration in 
the survey process and training.  
Previously, as politicians distributed cash to favoured or ‘handpicked’ households, objective 
targeting for delivering digital payments had considerably shrunk their power base. This 
measure adversely impacted on their vote bank in future elections, so many local politicians 
resisted to the change as it stripped their political powers and diminished their control, 
popularity and authority in their regional constituencies. The poverty score-card was neutral to 
specific qualitative dimensions of marginality and exclusion, such as local power relations, 
status, kinship, provincial identity and religious minority which had registered genuine 
beneficiaries into the state welfare system. Hence, this was a rare instance of a social 
intervention that impartially reached out to all deserved households across the country. The 
Director General of Cash Transfers stated,   
 
Credit goes to the political government who agreed to shift to m-banking. It was not an easy 
political decision because around 2.24 million beneficiaries were getting money from 
politicians. So it was a difficult time for any political government to remove beneficiaries from 
the list, who were identified by parliamentarians, as moving from community-based targeting 
to poverty score-card targeting was a potential threat for local politicians (Director General of 
Cash Transfers, BISP). 
 
So while there was tremendous support from government officials at the federal level, local 
politicians resisted the shift to electronic G2P channels, as digital payments enacted new 
structures and processes that affected the power equilibrium in the G2P system.  
 
5.2.2 Regulatory and Economic Forces 
 
Digital payment innovation within BISP was driven by regulatory and economic forces within 
the branchless banking framework enacted by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Branchless 
banking regulations, issued in 2008, provided an enabling environment for banks to increase 
their financial outreach through banking agents, ATMs or POS machines that served as cash-
out points for beneficiaries. Moreover, branchless banking regulation supported the bank-led 
model for banks to collaborate with mobile operators and extend mobile payments to those 
beneficiaries, living in rural or underserved regions, where setting up bank branches or agent 
channels would have otherwise been costly. Although regulators’ efforts were commended in 
supporting the branchless banking infrastructure, they were criticised by certain mobile 
operators for playing a passive role in the G2P sector in Pakistan. As exclaimed by a mobile 
operator Director,  
 
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority and the State Bank have been recognised and 
celebrated as very good regulators- in terms of their vision of how to go about things and the 
balance that they’ve maintained between banks and telecoms in this entire effort. On the G2P 
side, there’s nothing that regulators have done as much as we want- G2P payments was a 
P01- Power, Politics and Digital Development 
 
 
15 
 
Government initiative and not a State Bank initiative. We’ve been pushing both regulators for 
a long time to digitise all G2P payments in this country, and the benefits are going to be huge, 
but I’m surprised that nobody has the vision to do anything in that area. So have the regulators 
been beneficial for G2P? Not really, they’ve just sat back! (Director, Easypaisa) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the creation of the agent infrastructure by banks for BISP disbursements was 
cost-effective in the long-term, despite the high initial set up costs for banks owing to the 
provision of digital instruments (mobile phones, smart cards or debit cards) to beneficiaries. 
This was justified by a senior bank manager,  
 
The setting up of branchless banking channels through agent networks to serve the unbanked 
segment is a viable solution for economic entities, as the cost of setting up a branchless banking 
channel is at least 75% lower than setting up a bank branch (Assistant Manager, Summit Bank). 
 
Although banks provided accounts with limited functionality that were essentially conduit 
accounts for withdrawing G2P payments only, the implications on financial inclusion were 
restrictive for users. This is because the accounts failed to provide women user’s access to a 
fuller spectrum of financial services, such as money transfers, credit and saving facilities. 
While this limitation hindered revenue streams for banks, the provision of low value individual 
accounts to millions of users made the business case profitable for banks, as economies of scale 
were achieved through the sheer volume of transactions. Additionally, regular government fees 
and float5 earned by banks made digital payments attractive for banks to remain in business, 
despite the high costs of acquiring and managing new agent channels. A BISP official 
disclosed,  
 
As per agreement, banks are required to credit the money into the beneficiaries’ accounts within 
five days. Once the beneficiaries’ accounts get credited, not all of them withdraw their money 
at once, and since their account is a non-salary account, by default they earn float. Also, we are 
paying 3% of the dispersed amount as service charges to banks, so they have a strong business 
case with us (Director of Payments, BISP). 
 
Another narrative was presented by a mobile operator director, who criticised the role of banks 
in providing a limited range of financial services to users, but applauded how mobile operators 
were proactively serving G2P beneficiaries across the country in the m-banking pilots.  
 
Banks cannot serve large G2P populations…let me tell you….how will they do it? There are 
no branches that banks can put up- it’s only branchless banking players that are suited for this. 
So banks, solely, can’t serve beneficiaries, unless they collaborate with the mobile operator 
industry (Director, Easypaisa). 
                                                          
5 In economics, float is defined as duplicate money present in the banking system during the time that elapses 
between when a check is deposited into a bank account and when the funds are available to the recipient, during 
which period the bank is collecting payment from the sender’s bank. It can also be used as an investable asset, 
but makes up the smallest part of the money supply- adopted from the financial dictionary.  
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Hence, digital innovation in the G2P sector was perceived as a socio-economic process leading 
to change that involved negotiation and collaboration with BISP actors.  
 
5.1.3 International Forces  
 
International donor agencies played a significant role in the transition to digital payments in 
the programme. BISP management faced mounting pressure from the international donor 
community to digitise G2P outflows with the aim to attain transparency in the payment process. 
Hence, international donors provided technical and financial assistance in the targeting and 
delivery of digital G2P payments to poor women beneficiaries. So for BISP and donors alike, 
financial inclusion appeared to be the secondary agenda in the transition to m-banking. A BISP 
official verified, 
 
International donors got involved in the targeting of beneficiaries and they provided technical 
and financial assistance for the m-banking payment mechanism as well. Donor assistance was 
always there and they insisted on moving to systems that were transparent and financially 
inclusive- the World Bank, DFID, Agricultural Development Bank and USAID- are all donors 
working closely with us (Director General of Cash Transfers, BISP). 
 
Moreover, international donors supported the institutional strengthening of BISP through 
transparent delivery mechanisms. Hence, both at the policy and practice levels, donors pressed 
for greater accountability in the G2P payment system. Thus, it was evident that foreign forces 
played an instrumental role in instituting transparency mechanisms within the disbursement of 
social cash. As further highlighted by a DFID official, 
 
For DFID, it is important that there is transparency in the delivery of social cash, but also that 
there is institutional strengthening in systems in BISP so that there is also good accountability. 
We have invested three hundred million pounds until 2020, but it is important that there is a 
move towards electronic payments, including m-banking which BISP itself is committed to 
(DFID Director). 
 
5.3 Institutional Forces  
Analysing the themes coded from interviews with BISP officials, working at the strategic, 
managerial and operational levels, unveiled the institutional forces that affected the shift to 
digital payments that affected structures and processes within BISP. The table illustrates the 
themes mapped from the interview guide to present the findings in relation to the research 
question.  
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BISP Management  Social Effects  
 
Technological Effects 
Institutional Forces  Replacing human intermediaries 
with technology 
 
Transparency 
Visibility  
Live reconciliation  
Complaint redress 
Efficiency and Security  
 
Effects of Institutional Forces on BISP Management  
Source: Interviews 
 
5.3.1 Transparency and Visibility  
 
Prior to digital innovation in the BISP programme, there were grave concerns that cash 
payments did not reach deserving households. Some parliamentarians and postmen pocketed 
the money, or demanded baksheesh (bribes) from women to ensure the delivery of future 
payments at home. Thus previously, there was a disconnection between BISP managers at the 
head office with the middlemen in the field who disbursed payments to women. In this respect, 
digital payments enabled BISP managers to tackle one of the most perceptible challenges- 
achieving transparency within structures and processes in the disbursement chain. Technology 
streamlined the G2P channels to ensure that beneficiaries received the promised amount of 
grant. Thus, digital technologies can be perceived as part of the disciplinary mechanism for 
BISP that attempted to improve accountability in G2P delivery. This analysis can be 
understood from the governance objective, as proclaimed by the Director General of Cash 
Transfers at BISP, 
 
The primary objective of digital payments was to ensure transparency because there were 
transparency issues involved in making payments through the Pakistan Post. We were getting 
news that the postmen were involved in corruption, so we implemented technology-based 
systems, or m-banking, in hoping that the deserving beneficiaries would get the total amount 
from us (Director General of Cash Transfers, BISP). 
 
These findings were consistent with studies that portrayed how digital payments were 
introduced to reduce the risks of bribes at the end of the delivery chain and reduced delivery 
costs for governments (Pickens, Porteous and Rotman, 2009). Cashing out at pay points 
provided greater choice to beneficiaries in withdrawing their payments, and further mitigated 
the risks of fraud or corruption with enhanced security (Emmett, 2012; Gelb and Decker, 2012). 
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Other studies also mirrored that digital G2P payments were less prone to fraud because 
electronic transfers created an auditable trail from the government to the final recipient (Bold, 
Porteous and Rotman, 2009). Since the transfer of digital G2P payments involved banks, 
payments were regulated under stringent banking conditions that increased pressure on 
programme managers. As regulators frequently demanded an accurate documentation of 
disbursements, it was difficult for political actors to illegally divert large sums of money from 
the payment channels (Devereux and Vincent, 2010).  Another senior BISP official echoed that 
m-banking initiatives were measures undertaken to enhance the visibility in making payments 
by political actors,  
 
Mobile banking was adopted for the real-time visibility of payments, so beneficiaries were 
instantly informed when the money was transferred into their accounts. Pakistan Post had 
problems with visibility, as after 3 months, we got to know about the money status. So the 
digitised tool informed us about the status of payments immediately (Outreach Manager, BISP). 
 
Other studies in the literature also mirrored these findings in illustrating that digital payments 
enhanced accountability in procedures. Studies from Argentina evidenced that digital payments 
marked a significant decline in bribes at pay points, resulting in an additional value of USD 
$10.7 million of payments reaching the hands of final beneficiaries (Pickens, Porteous and 
Rotman, 2009). Further, research from Bangladesh also highlighted the advantages of digital 
innovation in the G2P sector, which was primarily driven by the institutional goals to decrease 
transaction costs by reducing corruption in the social cash programme (Rotman, 2014).  
 
Whilst visibility for discipline lied at the core of technology-enabled platforms that improved 
communication and service delivery for BISP officials, the complexity of this disciplinary 
mechanism arising from digital payments, engendered greater dialogue between the state, 
foreign and local beneficiary actors. However, this change can be perceived through the power 
lens as there some conflict of interests visible in few BISP officials. Whilst it was evidenced 
how digital payments facilitated BISP officials in the routinisation and standardisation of the 
grant disbursement process, it was also at odds with BISP staff who lost their autonomy with 
the introduction of technology. This was further explicated by a BISP Manager who expressed 
his personal resentment and bias towards the shift from cash to digital payment platforms for 
disbursing social cash.  
 
But there is a handicap with m-banking that we are dependent upon the information provided 
to us by banks, so we are bound and feel rather restricted- everyone does not have real-time 
information, so we get the picture that is dictated to us by banks! (Outreach Manager, BISP) 
 
This narrative suggested that digital innovation within the programme, apparently, disturbed 
the power equilibrium between BISP officials and bankers. Since technology transferred more 
control and authority to bankers, some BISP mangers felt powerless, as they were solely 
dependent upon banks for providing information on payment status. However, this questioning 
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may just seem to be an excuse where state officials do not wish to account to stakeholders, 
beneficiaries, or other foreign interest groups involved in the programme. Hence, the discourse 
that technology produced and reproduced structures of power within organisations that 
favoured and/or disfavoured certain socio-political actors over others in the m-banking 
ecosystem becomes prominent in the study. 
 
5.3.2 Live Reconciliation and Complaint Redress  
 
The findings further evinced that digital payments enabled BISP management in the live 
reconciliation of payments. In essence, it created formal reporting tools in assisting managers 
to receive accurate data on beneficiaries’ payment statuses in the most efficient manner. Hence, 
the automated payment system provided managers access to reliable, real-time data that was 
consistent with the information held at the BISP regional offices. At the administrative level, 
it enabled officials to check and validate beneficiaries’ payment information in real time. As 
soon as a beneficiary cashed out her payment, the information was instantaneously received by 
BISP administration for verification. As stated by the Director Operations,  
 
As it is a real-time system, the staff at BISP can check whether the money has reached the 
beneficiary or not (Director Operations, BISP). 
 
At the users end, m-banking also enabled beneficiaries to check their payment details, and if 
there were any noted incidents of missed or delayed payments, beneficiaries could directly 
register their complaints with BISP field officers. This is mirrored in the words of the Director 
General of Payments at BISP,  
 
So m-banking gave us an edge that we could communicate with each beneficiary regarding her 
payment status. Before, Pakistan Post provided reconciliation after 3 or 4 months, and even in 
that, there were errors. In the digital delivery mode, there is no time lag and as it is a real-time 
system, we get real-time information on reconciliations- that is- whether the money has reached 
the beneficiary or not after disbursement (Director General of Payments, BISP).  
 
Moreover, through the new mobile payment platform, beneficiaries’ complaints were 
registered and efficiently resolved. As a result, there was a considerable reduction observed in 
the number of complaints recorded that diminished the administrative burdens for BISP 
officials as opposed to handling manual complaints. The Director General of Payments at BISP 
avowed,  
 
Initially, we did not have any state-of-the-art system for complaint redress- situational 
complexities started creeping in, and then we received complaints that postmen ‘devour’ 
money. So there was a mandatory requirement that a complaint redress mechanism needs to be 
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in place- m-banking has resolved it now and the number of complaints are significantly less 
(Director General of Payments, BISP). 
 
Therefore, digital payment innovation was driven by the demand to enhance reporting rates 
and service delivery of payments in instituting an effective feedback system in the programme. 
 
5.3.3 Efficiency and Security  
 
The findings disclosed that digital payments afforded efficient delivery channels that visibly 
reduced transfer time, as the grant money instantly reached beneficiaries’ digital accounts.  
Hence, it enabled BISP managers to transfer large volume of payments, efficiently to 
beneficiaries who resided in far flung areas of the country. This feature is attributed to digital 
payments that effectively decreased the intermediary steps in the disbursement process. The 
Director of Payments professed, 
 
The move from cash based payments to digital payments in the delivery of G2P ensures that 
payments are delivered to the actual beneficiary in a secure, quick and most efficient manner 
(Director of Payments, BISP). 
 
Furthermore, the Director General of Cash Transfers resonated that m-banking facilitated BISP 
officials in serving millions of beneficiaries through secure payment modes. This was deemed 
critical, especially in regions, where political volatility was a potential threat for the 
disbursement process, amidst the security arrangements in the affected localities.  
 
M-banking provides a secure mode for making large volume transactions to beneficiaries in 
political volatile regions, and the monitoring system is overarching and efficient (Director 
General of Cash Transfers, BISP). 
 
Hence, disbursing cash electronically reduced transaction costs for managers, in addition to the 
time and effort involved in sorting cash manually and delivering payments through entrusted 
intermediaries. Thus, m-banking by-passed human intermediaries in the delivery chain and 
transferred cash, instantly and safely, directly into beneficiaries’ bank accounts. These findings 
conformed to studies that exhibited that programme managers were less reliant on security staff 
and intermediaries with the implementation of digital channels for disbursing social cash. This 
is because intermediaries no longer travelled extensively while carrying huge amounts of cash, 
so their vulnerability to ambushes was palpably reduced (Devereux and Vincent, 2010).  
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6. Conclusions and Contributions 
 
The study shed light on the interplay between the external and internal institutional forces that 
influenced the social construction of digital payments in the BISP programme and its 
implications on management practices. In relation to the ICT for development discourse, it may 
be argued that digital innovation was conceived as a socio-political process that arose from 
local problems, albeit influenced by external actors in the course of its social construction. 
External influences shaped the design of digital payments in the programme, although 
organisational rules and norms were reaffirmed and challenged by political, economic, 
regulatory and international actors. Hence, the social construction of digital payments reflected 
on how shared interpretations, mutual interests and conflicts between social actors were 
exchanged and negotiated during digital innovation projects in the BISP programme.  
For instance, whilst international donors imposed their own agendas on the political 
administration for securing transparency in G2P payments, these streamlined with BISP’s 
organisational objectives to enhance governance through improved accountability procedures. 
These measures overall contributed to BISP’s institutional strengthening. In addition, 
regulatory and economic forces provided the contextual inputs or resources that underpinned 
the branchless banking infrastructure for executing digital payments. As delivering cash 
payments presented security and transaction cost concerns for the government and BISP alike, 
digital innovation reduced the long term costs for both BISP and banks whilst expanding the 
outreach of payments for women residing in financially underserved populations in Pakistan. 
Further, whilst economic actors also pressurised political actors for implementing digital 
payments in BISP, the political motivations of stakeholders aligned with BISP’s institutional 
interests. It was showcased that by strengthening their business case through BISP 
disbursements, economic actors received financial gains. In the meanwhile, the transition to 
digital payments boosted the government’s international standing, as through the BISP 
programme, they earned political mileage.   
Hence, as contribution to the ICT for development literature, the study sheds light that digital 
innovation was socially embedded in the BISP context, so hence was progressively 
transformative for management (Avgerou, 2010). This was because technology was ‘situated’ 
in the organisational context for programme managers and enacted through usage. Hence, it 
was inclusive to management’s objectives whilst concurrently aligning with donor’s interests. 
Hence, the social construction of technology was a socio-political process that involved 
multiple social actors which predominantly shifted the equilibrium of power between local 
actors- BISP managers, politicians and bankers.  
Hence, the primary objective for digital payment innovation was to alleviate the surmounting 
foreign pressure to secure transparency, visibility and efficiency in the delivery of large scale 
payments securely covering wider populations. These goals were seen to be paramount over 
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the financial inclusion objectives. From BISP’s perspective, digital innovation was 
transformative (Avgerou, 2008; 2010) and driven by external and institutional forces. 
Consequently, digital payments reduced corruption or ‘leakage’ by governments as G2P 
payments were directly delivered into beneficiaries’ digital accounts. Whilst technology 
eliminated ‘human intermediaries’ (politicians and postmen), it is concluded that digital 
payments introduced new intermediary structures of authority (banks and banking agents) to 
disburse social cash. This gives rise to the discourse that digital innovation created new 
structures that affected the power equilibrium of social actors within the payment chain. Whilst 
BISP transferred G2P payments to banks, banks onwards credited women beneficiaries’ 
accounts, who cashed-out at banking agents, ATMs or POS devices.  
In this context, Kemal and Yan (2015) argued that the discussion on m-banking in eliminating 
human intermediaries from the G2P delivery chain is two-fold. The agent infrastructure, at the 
front-end, for cashing-out G2P payments replaced former intermediaries, or ‘middlemen’ in 
the delivery chain. As new technologies mediated the cash-out process for beneficiaries, digital 
technologies inscribed new practices in its design. Studies also displayed how technology 
established a network of intermediaries, known as innofusion intermediaries, in order to 
promote inclusivity at the Bottom of the Pyramid (Foster and Heeks, 2013). This reinforces the 
argument that as a result of digital technologies, new structures of power may emerge at grass 
root levels in poor communities. Further, through a power lens, it is concluded that the creation 
of new intermediaries, resulting from digital payments, ‘conditioned’ new G2P practices as 
power was transferred from human intermediaries to new structures using technology in BISP 
communities in Pakistan.  
Hence, as further contribution to the ICT for Development literature, the paper sheds light on 
the political aspects of digital payment innovation in the G2P sector, in contrast to previous 
technological deterministic approaches that framed the ICT innovation literature. Whilst 
empowering certain political actors, digital payments may ‘disempower’ other social agents 
involved in the disbursement of social cash. More interestingly, the study has implications for 
policy makers and governments as it provides lessons on how governments and international 
donor agencies may negotiate with each other in order to strike a balance between foreign and 
local developmental interests. For bankers and mobile operator staff, valuable insights are 
gained from this paper signifying how financially inclusive services may be offered to advance 
the financial inclusion agenda through digital innovation projects. Also, careful attention needs 
to be paid whilst evaluating the business interests of all stakeholder groups while adopting a 
multidisciplinary approach to ensure that precedence is not given to an exclusive group during 
digital innovation. Although this paper emphasised on the political nature of digital innovation 
in G2P programmes, to some extent, it may be correct to say that it overlooked the participation 
of users- a valuable stakeholder group that should not be neglected in the construction of future 
G2P digital inclusion programmes in any developing country.  
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